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The aim of this dissertation is to study the relationship between banks’ ownership 
structure and its risk-taking behaviour. Additionally, we also examine the impact of the 
banking regulation in the way that banks take their risk. The empirical analysis considers 
a sample of listed banks from EU countries, over the period spanning from 2011 to 2016. 
The econometric model used was a generalized least squares random effect regression, 
since we are considering a balanced panel dataset. We test the hypothesis that banks 
with a large shareholder structure have the propensity to take on more risk, when 
comparing to those who have a more diffuse shareholder structure. We also consider 
the structure of the board of directors as an explanatory variable in our model: if a bigger 
board or more independent directors have an influence on the bank risk-taking 
behaviour.  
Taking into account the selected sample, we found some evidence that the board of 
director’s structure can influence the bank risk behaviour. On the other hand, to the 
ownership concentration, little or no evidence was found. Regarding the influence of 
the regulatory environment in the bank risk, there is no significant relationship between 
them, i.e. stricter regulation has no effect on how banks take their risk. 
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Banks play a crucial role in the economic growth and are responsible for preserving 
financial stability. For instance, the bankruptcy of one of the largest investment banks 
in the United States, the Lehman Brothers, triggered a financial crisis that affected 
countries across the world. As a consequence, governments and central banks refocused 
their attention on the financial sector and, more particularly, on the banking system. 
Regulators began to deploy more restrict regulation, in order to create a robust banking 
system, capable of enduring the next financial crisis with increased resilience. Among 
the many causes of instability in the banking sector, the risk-taking behaviour is one of 
the main sources of insolvency. In the case of European banks, greater exposures to 
systemic risk, due to shadow banking activities, caused worse performances (Acharya et 
al., 2013; Arteta et al., 2013). Additionally, according to Beltratti & Stulz (2012), banks 
with higher stock returns before the period of the latest crisis, corresponded to those 
that performed worse during the crisis.  
Going forward, recent studies show that the risk-taking behaviour is related with the 
corporate governance of the bank. As Beltratti & Stulz (2012) suggest, during financial 
crisis, the stronger the corporate governance, lesser risk the banks took, and 
consequently better they performed. The corporate governance can be characterized in 
several ways: concerning to ownership structure – is the financial institution owned by 
a large shareholder, or by diffuse shareholders? Banks are considered to have a good 
ownership concentration when their shareholders are diffuse, because in the cases 
where large shareholders are present, they will tend to behave in their own interest, 
which is taking more risky portfolios to consequently have higher returns, even if that is 
harmful to the performance of the bank - agency problems (Laeven & Levine, 2009; Esty, 
1998; Galai & Masulis, 1976). The structure and the composition of the board of 
directors may also play a role in the incentives of a bank to be more risky or not. Smaller 
board size may perform better as the risk of disagreements, due to diversified points of 
views, is diminished and the decision making process of the strategy is more 
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straightforward. On the other hand, if directors are not independent from the bank, 
their behaviour can be skewed and more prone to conflict of interests (de Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008). 
In the context of a financial crisis, it is also important to understand the role of the 
regulators - is it true to say that more restrict regulation implicates lesser risk behaviour? 
According to Laeven & Levine (2009), the impact of the regulation varies from bank to 
bank according to the type of the corporate governance. For instance, financial 
institutions with larger shareholders tend to choose riskier investment portfolios in 
order to compensate for the utility loss by stringent capital requirements. 
Therefore, it is very important to analyse the role corporate governance plays on 
banks’ risk-taking behaviour and how the regulatory framework affects it. This 
dissertation differs from the previous studies in terms of the period that we are 
analysing, which is between 2011 and 2016, whereas the recent literature essentially 
covers until a few years after the financial crisis. The majority of the empirical analysis 
uses a sample of countries across the world or in the United States, whereas scarce 
studies are focused on European countries. Moreover, using a balanced panel dataset, 
including observations of European banks, we regress a generalized least squares 
random effect model to determine whether the corporate governance influence the 
bank risk-taking behaviour as well as the role of regulation in this relationship. 
The dissertation is structure as follows: in Section 2 we briefly introduce the 
economic environment and describe the banking sector. In Section 3 we present some 
literature review regarding corporate governance, risk and regulation and the 
relationship between them. In Section 4 we describe the data and the methodology 
used. In Section 5 we show the results of the empirical assessment and finally in section 
6 we summarize the conclusions of this dissertation. 
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2. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE BANKING SECTOR 
 
Going back ten years, more specifically to September 2008, Lehman Brothers 
collapse was the catalyst that ignited the conditions that were being built for several 
years, ultimately resulting in the eruption of the latest global financial crisis. This shock 
deteriorated the economy environment in several ways: GDP started to decrease, from 
26,100 euro per capita in 2008 to 24,500 euro per capita in 2009 as showed in figure 
A.1. This decline was essentially led by a contraction in exports and less private 
investment, namely in manufacturing and industry (including energy) sectors as showed 
in table A.I. The unemployment rate, as presented in figure A.2, reached record 
numbers, which consequently also depressed private consumption (figure A.3).  
The collapse of the Lehman Brothers acted just a trigger, since the global 
macroeconomic environment was already showing worrying signs of imbalances and a 
weak financial system being slowly installed. The lack of strong regulation and 
supervisory frameworks have progressively lead to a higher risk-taking behaviour by 
banks, where riskier investment portfolios were chosen to get higher returns. According 
to Kosmidoua et al. (2017) and Cohen et al. (2014), higher opacity in a bank, i.e. less 
financial transparency and information asymmetry, is strongly associated to a stock 
crash risk. At the pre-crisis period the banking sector had precisely being accumulating 
this kind of opaque financial products and risky assets, of which asset backed securities 
are the main example. Moreover, liquidity issues were also identified as one of the 
origins for the vulnerability of the financial market (Longstaff, 2010), in a sense that toxic 
assets could not be recovered, or liquidated, and consequently banks were unable to 
raise funds in the market. 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis forced significant structural changes in the 
macroeconomic environment and in the financial system, particularly in the regulatory 
and supervisory framework. Governments and central banks refocused their attention 
on the banking system, and began to implement several reforms in this regard. For 
instance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reformulated and upgraded the 
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Basel Committee Standards by announcing in December 2010 the Basel III framework. 
This enhanced global regulatory framework had the purpose to foster a more resilient 
banking system, by introducing the global liquidity risk standards and the overall 
leverage ratio, as well as strengthening the capital requirements that were already put 
in place in the past decade (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).  
As regards Europe, the reforms enclosed with the application of Basel III (started in 
2013) along with the implementation of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM), 
officially launched in 2014. The SSM composition consisted mainly on transferring the 
direct supervision of significant banks, assessed in terms of dimension and systemic 
importance, from the national competent authorities to the European Central Bank. 
Additionally, on the monetary policy front, some extreme measures were taken to 
stimulate the economic growth. The ECB has progressively decreased the reference 
interest rate to unprecedented low figures, even reaching real negative levels, and 
embarked on unconventional measures, such as increasing its balance sheet through 
the purchasing of large amounts of government bonds with the aim of decreasing real 
interest rates. 
Hence, structural financial indicators started to reveal some recovering from the 
crisis in the banking sector. As illustrated in figure 1, the net interest income smoothly 
increased, comparing to the values before crisis, as a repercussion of the low interest 








Figure 1 - Net interest income of top 20 European banks | Euro bn 
Source: Schildbach (2017), p. 2 – figure 2 
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Notwithstanding, total revenue has declined (figure 2), as a significant fall in trading 
income (figure 3) and fees and commissions (figure 4) have more than compensated the 










The raise, from 2008 to 2016, of the share of operating income in total assets (figure 
5) along with lower expenses (figure 6) demonstrates that banks nowadays seek for a 
more safe asset allocation, with an improvement on the management strategy and 
rigorous supervision (European Central Bank, 2017). 
 
Source: Schildbach (2017), p. 3 – figure 6 
Figure 2 - Total revenues of top 20 European banks | EUR bn 
Figure 4 - Fees and Commissions of top 
20 European banks | EUR bn) 
Source: Schildbach (2017), p. 3 – figure 3 
Figure 3 - Trading income of top 20 
European banks  | Euro bn 
Source: Schildbach (2017), p. 3 – figure 4 
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Figure 5 - Operating income structure of the euro area banking sector (all domestic 
banks) | Percentage of total assets 
Source: European Central Bank (2017), p. 41 – chart 2.28 
Figure 6 - Composition of operating expense of the euro area banking sector 
(all domestic banks) | Percentage of total assets 
Source: European Central Bank (2017), p. 42 – chart 2.32 
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More demanding capital requirements had the intended effect of increasing the 
capital ratio (figure 7). In this context, regulators and policy makers are more focused 
on the Common Equity Tier 1 definition, due not only to the more straightforward capital 








Lastly, in terms of market indicators, the European financial stocks are still 
recovering from the financial crisis aftermath, figure 8 shows that levels of shares prices 
continue to be lower than pre-crisis period, caused by the heritage of toxic assets and 
non-performing loans (Basten & Serrano, 2018) from which legacy is revealing to be 









Figure 7- Core risk-weighted capital ratio* of top 20 European banks |  
%, unweighted average 
* 2007: Tier 1 ratio ; 2017: Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (Basel III fully loaded) 
Source: Schildbach (2017), p. 5 – figure 12 
Figure 8- Evolution of share prices of European banks 
Source: Basten & Serrano (2018), figure 1 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to maintain a sound and resilient economy, each agent within needs to play 
its role in the best way they can. As a practical example, financial institutions, particularly 
banks, act as the bridge between lenders and borrowers, thus playing a role as financial 
intermediaries, by channelling funds from one to another. Besides allocating savings and 
granting credit, they also provide payments services such as credit transfers, direct 
debits, card payments, mobile and online payments. In this perspective, banks are quite 
different from non-financial firms since their business model is very distinct.  
On one hand, banks are highly leveraged, where debt typically represents more than 
90 percent of the balance sheet, comparing to 20-30 percent in the case of non-financial 
firms (Gornall & Strebulaev, 2014). Due to this singularity, any increase in bank debt has 
a great effect in the banks’ profitability, especially during financial crisis (Konstantinos, 
2012).  
On the other hand, Levine (2004) suggests that in the banking system large 
informational asymmetries exist between internal and external parties, leading to more 
opaque institutions. Insiders1, tend to choose riskier portfolios in order to have larger 
returns, conversely debt holders (as outsiders) are more inclined to take less risk. 
Thereafter, the existence of opaqueness makes more difficult for outsiders to control 
this risk-taking behaviour. Naturally, with the purpose to protect bank’s outsiders, 
governments and supervisors are forced to be stricter in terms of regulating the banking 
sector, such as establishing minimum capital requirements. 
Since the last financial crisis, affecting a large number of countries worldwide, 
several studies have been focusing on finding more deeply the causes at the origin of 
the shock. Previous literatures suggest that a relationship between banks’ performance 
and their risk-taking behaviour do exist (Acharya et al., 2013; Arteta et al., 2013). 
Considering the crucial role that banks play in the economic growth and their 
                                                 
1 For example controlling owners 
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responsibility in preserving the financial stability, an augmenting in their risk-taking 
behaviour generates an economic fragility (Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris & Mason, 
2003a,b; Keeley, 1990). Additionally, the interaction between a weak risk management 
and a complex and opaque financial products, only further deteriorates the financial 
system.  
Hence, one of the responsible parties for a bank to be riskier or not are the board of 
directors, in a sense that they are the ones responsible for defining the bank’s strategy 
and advising managers on their decisions. The type of board of directors established in 
a bank could determine the distance of insolvency (Battaglia & Gallo, 2017). On the 
other hand, managers also influence the bank risk-taking behaviour as they are directly 
responsible for the decisions in the operational business lines and day-to-day business. 
In this context, banks’ corporate governance receives a reinforced attention among 
regulators, policy makers and researchers along with the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank risk-taking. Kirkpatrick (2009) goes as far as to argue 
that the main cause of the 2007-2008 financial crisis was precisely the presence of a 
poor governance in the banking industry. 
John et al. (2016) compiled the existent literature on corporate governance in banks, 
specifically with respect to corporate boards, ownership and managerial incentives. 
They present the empirical assessments’ results from various authors, displaying 
divergent conclusions on the issues previously mentioned. This fact also shows that this 
topic has been strongly discussed among researchers in order to better understand the 
role of corporate governance in banks.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has also addressing this issue in its 
research works, by publishing guidelines and consultative documents on corporate 
governance. Particularly, the most recent consultative document, “Principles for 
enhancing corporate governance” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010), 
references a set of principles for a sound corporate governance in the banking industry. 
Furthermore, this subject was also included in Pillar 2 requirements (supervisory review 
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process) of Basell II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005, pp. 163–1642), 
reinforcing the importance of monitoring risk management and establishing principles 
for a good corporate governance. 
Despite several papers revealing some evidence between governance structure and 
bank risk (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; John et al., 2008), there is 
no consensus in the sign of this relationship. 
According to Laeven & Levine (2009), Esty (1998) and Galai & Masulis (1976), an 
ownership with large shareholders raises bank risk. Comparing with managers, 
shareholders typically have a more diversified portfolio and the losses of choosing a 
riskier portfolio would not damage their personal wealth so deeply. In addition, for 
banks with a very concentrated ownership, its shareholders will have stronger power to 
control the strategic decisions, holding back the opinion of the minority shareholders.  
A corporate structure divided by the board of directors and managers creates some 
agency problems (Berle & Means, 1932). In one way, banks with large shareholders tend 
to choose directors of the board with the purpose of protecting their own interest of 
taking more risk. On the contrary, managers have a less diversified investment portfolio 
and the fact of holding bank’s equity leads them to take less risky activities (Saunders et 
al., 1990; Bouwens & Verriest, 2014). However, the outcome of Iannotta et al. (2007) 
research is different from the previous literature, arguing that “higher ownership 
concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower 
insolvency risk”.  
The structure of the board of directors can also be characterized in terms of size and 
independence. Concerning the latter, it is expected that independent members 
(someone with no relation with the institution) have a more uncompromised 
involvement with the financial institution comparing to shareholders and managers, and 
consequently make more reasonable decisions. In this regard, a negative association 
                                                 
2 In July 2009, the Pillar 2 framework was revised due to the weakness founded during the financial 
crisis and published a new document with stricter principles (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2009). 
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between bank risk-taking and independence is supported by various researchers 
(Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Wang & Hsu, 2013). Beltratti & Stulz (2012), 
conclude that banks with a shareholder-friendly board take more risk during crises, by 
using a sample of large banks across the world. Erkens et al. (2012) suggest that, in crisis 
periods, banks performed better when a more independent board was present, since 
those elements were crucial on the decision of increasing capital, thus transferring 
wealth from shareholders to debt holders. Wang & Hsu (2013) test the effect of the 
board composition and the probability of a bank having an operational risk event. The 
results show that board independence is inversely related to the risk of financial 
institutions in that front.  
In terms of the board size, Battaglia & Gallo (2017) found that banks with larger 
number of elements in the board suffered greater losses during the crisis, which affected 
the financial stability by exposing the institutions to more systematic risk. This empirical 
evidence follow Wang & Hsu (2013), who also suggest that operational risk management 
performs worse when a bigger board was present. The fact that a board size negatively 
affects banks’ performance is associated with the fact that numerous directors lead to 
a more diversified culture and personalities in the board, generating different opinions 
and strategies for the bank. Additionally, during board meetings it would become more 
difficult to coordinate and obtain a unanimous decision. 
Summing up, strong boards (small size in terms of members and a higher number of 
them being independent directors, as defined by Pathan (2009) and Battaglia & Gallo 
(2017)) tend to take less risk and perform better comparing to those with larger board 
size and less independent directors. 
In contrast, Adams (2012) shows that banks characterized as having strong boards, 
are associated with the TARP (Trouble Asset Relief Program) and an inverted u-shape is 
reflected when analysing the effect of a bank board structure on bank’s performed (de 
Andres & Vallelado, 2008). Those different perspectives presume there is still no 
consensus among economic investigators and still more analysis is needed. John et al. 
(2000, 2008) reveal mixed results, indicating that the impact of corporate governance 
on bank risk-taking depends also on the capital regulation. The findings suggest that 
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regulators should take this issue into account in periods of reforms, by distinguishing 
regulation among financial institutions, according to bank characteristics such as the 
corporate governance. 
One of the principal instruments for regulators to control bank risk is through capital 
adequacy. This Instrument is being enhanced over the past years, in particular after the 
last financial crisis. With the former, more relaxed, capital adequacy instruments, 
several banks had still to be rescued or recapitalized, including those considered “too-
big-to-fail”, consequently severely unbalancing the financial system. A higher 
percentage of capital adequacy suggests that the financial institution is more stable and 
have less credit exposures, which in turn contributes to preventing future insolvencies 
(Jeitschko & Jeung, 2005; Grossman, 1992). Commonly, central banks and supervisors 
set a minimum of capital requirements and monitor those closely through periodic 
reports. Recently, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) published Basel III, 
encompassing stricter standards principles for Pillar I, which incorporate the monitoring 
of capital, risk coverage and leverage containment. The question is, does this type of 
regulation actually reduce the bank risk-taking behaviour? In some sense, a few authors 
suggest that an increase of the minimum capital requirements would lead to higher risk, 
as banks tend to compensate the utility loss of stricter regulation (Buser et al., 1981; 
Koehn & Santomero, 1980; Laeven & Levine, 2009;). In this perspective, when the capital 
adequacy ratio is determined, banks are inclined to invest in risky assets as far as the 
capital requirement is reached. As mentioned before, the relationship between 
ownership structure and bank risk depends on the capital regulation, but on the other 
hand the risk-taking incentives also vary according to the ownership structure, even with 
the same regulation in one country (Laeven & Levine, 2009).  
All in all, it is important to emphasize the role of corporate governance in the banking 
industry since it is related with the risk-taking behaviour. Furthermore, the aim of the 
authorities to create a robust banking system that could endure the next financial crisis 
through the recourse to stricter regulation may not have the expected effect for all 
banks alike. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 DATA 
 
The initial dataset used in this study, considers all publicly listed active banks 
identified by Moody's Analytics BankFocus at the beginning of 2018. We focused on 
banks from European Union countries3 and collected data of income statement and 
balance sheet from the period of 2011 to 2016. This original sample was subsequently 
reduced to 140 banks due to problems of data availability, ultimately resulting in the 
exclusion of some countries from the analyses, namely Estonia, Ireland and 
Luxembourg. We have also eliminated France cooperative banks, specifically Credit 
Agricole group, since we are going to analyse the effect of ownership, risk and regulation 
of those regional banks through Credit Agricole S.A. Additionally, we only consider banks 
who were part of the EURO STOXX 50 Index for more than three years during the period 
comprised between 2011 and 2016. The final sample includes a balanced data of 726 
observations, representing 121 banks from 23 countries.  
The source of financial information was Moddy’s Analytics BankFocus, whereas data 
concerning corporate governance were hand-collected from the respective annual 
reports. The information about countries variables was obtained from Eurostat and 
complemented by the World Bank. Finally, the market information regarding mergers 
and acquisitions activities derived from SNL – S&P Global Market Intelligence. 
 
4.2 BANK RISK-TAKING 
 
The scope of financial institutions includes diverse activities and each subject is 
associated with specific risk though they are all related with each other. Some of those 
                                                 
3 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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risks are external and not controlled by bank managers, for instance risk related with 
adverse market movements (e.g. variations in the interest rate, foreign exchange, 
equities and commodities). However, banks should always be prepared for those types 
of events. Others, such as credit risk and operational risk, can be supervised and 
moderated depending on the strategy of the bank. Prior studies argued that risk 
behaviour is related with bank’s performance and consequently the probability of 
bankruptcy (Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris & Mason, 2003a,b; Keeley, 1990).  
A commonly used measure to proxy the variable of risk is the z-score, calculated as 
(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), also used by several authors: Laeven & Levine (2009), Pathan (2009) 
and Beltratti & Stulz (2012). ROA correspond to Return on Assets, calculated as Net 
income plus Interest Expense divided by Total assets. The CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio) 
is measured by the division of Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets and σ(ROA) 
indicates the volatility of Return of Assets. Bank’s z-score refers to the inverse 
probability of insolvency (Roy, 1952), whereby a higher value in the distance of failure 
indicates less risk and greater stability. As Laeven & Levine (2009) and Battaglia & Gallo 
(2017), we transform z-score into a natural logarithm, which is normally distributed, 
since this measure is highly skewed.  
We also examine a component of this measure separately, that is the Capital 
Adequacy Ratio, as a risk measure. The reason for integrating this variable in our model 
is due to this ratio being closely monitored by the regulators and supervisors, where 
higher values means a more stable bank. The data collected to calculate the two 
measures was obtained from Moddy’s Analytics BankFocus considering the period 2011-
2016. 
 
4.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The analysis of corporate governance can be conducted in different ways and in this 
dissertation we mainly focus on ownership concentration and the board of director’s 
structure. Information on bank ownership and board structures were hand-collected 
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from the annual reports from the year of 2016 of each bank. We assumed this data 
remained unchanged for the entire period (2011 to 2016) since corporate governance 
structures changes little over time (Black et al., 2006; Cremers & Ferrell, 2010; La Porta 
et al, 1998, 1999). Additionally, in case of absent information on the 2016 annual report, 
we based on the current situation with respect to ownership and bank board.  
Regarding the ownership concentration, we follow La Porta et al. (1999) and Laeven 
& Levine (2009) ownership references, and consider a bank as widely held when the 
largest shareholder holds less than 10% of the bank’s voting rights. In our model we 
distinguished ownership in two variables: a dummy variable that assumes 1 when it is 
classified as large shareholder and 0 otherwise; and the other as a direct percentage of 
the voting rights of the largest shareholder. 
Among other features, a strong board can be characterized as having a small size in 
terms of members and a higher number of them being independent directors (Pathan, 
2009; Battaglia & Gallo, 2017). For the board size we collected the number of directors 
on the board and for independence we considered the share of total directors who are 
independent. Independence is defined as follow: 
An independent director is not an existing or former employee of the banks or its 
immediate family members and does not have any significant business ties with the bank. 




Following prior studies (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Laeven & Levine, 2009), we use four 
variables as proxies of regulation: regulatory restrictions, capital stringency, power of 
official supervisor and private monitoring. All of those indicators are characterized by 
country and it is based on the World Bank Banking Supervision Survey4, conducted in 
2011 by Barth et al. (2012). The definition of the variables is as follow:  
                                                 
4 The survey provides information about the regulation and supervision for 143 countries, regarding 
the banking system. It consists on a set of questions grouped by a specific issue, where each answer 
ANA JIN YE                                                RISK-TAKING BY BANKS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION: 
                                                                                                                                                                    EVIDENCE FROM EU COUNTRIES 
16 
 
• Regulatory restrictions is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities; 
• Capital Stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital; 
• Power of official supervisor is an index of the power of the bank supervisory 
agency; 
• Private monitoring is an index of monitoring on the part of the private sector of 
the banking system. 
All of those indexes indicate the degree of regulation in a country, where greater 
values indicate that the bank industry is highly regulated. 
In our analysis we exclude the indicator of capital requirements that is commonly 
used by researchers. In fact, most of the samples used on those studies cover countries 
across the world where the regulation varies from country to country. In case of Europe, 
particularly in the countries of our sample, the minimum capital requirements is the 
same, settled as 8% (identical to Basel III). We also did not consider the dummy variable 
used by Laeven & Levine (2009) regarding deposit insurance, for the reason that all 
European countries are covered by a deposit guarantee scheme (defined by each 
national authority). 
 
4.5 CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Furthermore, we incorporate in our model certain control variables with respect to 
bank-specific characteristics. According to Demsetz & Strahan (1997), when compared 
with smaller banks, major financial institutions have a tendency to invest in more risky 
loan portfolios and operating with higher level of leverage ratios, since they can 
compensate from the benefits of having a more diversified options to invest. In this 
perspective, we account the leverage ratio variable as a control variable, corresponding 
to the division of tier 1 capital to total assets, where a lower ratio indicates more 
leverage, hence a higher bank risk.  
                                                 
corresponds to a numeric value. Our dissertation includes the follow issues: i) bank activity, ii) capital, iii) 
official supervisory and iv) private monitoring. 
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The variable bank credit risk is taken from the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans 
and aims to measure the amount of total loans, which are impaired or doubtful. It can 
also be considered as a proxy of portfolio quality (Casu et al., 2011), where a lower ratio 
means a better asset quality. A commonly used measure for asset quality is the loan loss 
provision over net interest revenue. This ratio indicates how much of interest income is 
reserved to non-performing loans (NPL). The variable for liquidity risk is calculated by 
the ratio of liquid assets (cash and balances with central banks plus net loans and 
advances to banks plus level one assets) over deposits and short term funding (customer 
deposits plus short term funding).  
To control the bank business activity, we considered the ratio of loans over total 
assets, corresponding to the percentage of total assets that are invested in the loan 
portfolio, controlling the differences in banking business model across banks (de Andres 
& Vallelado, 2008).  
We use the cost to income ratio to evaluate operational bank’s efficiency and this 
indicator is calculated as the ratio of total operating expenses over total operating 
income. A lower ratio means that the bank is more efficient. As previously mentioned, 
the size of the bank also affects the risk behaviour, so for that reason we use the natural 
logarithm of the total asset variable.  
Lastly, we include a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a bank was subject to a 
merger or a major acquisition over the sample period and 0 otherwise. These kind of 
events can indeed be disruptive and there is a good chance they might influence bank 
governance (Schranz, 1993; Berger et al., 1998).   
Regarding the country control variable, we use the logarithm of GDP per capita to 
account for economic environment changes. All bank-specific data were obtained from 
Moody's Analytics BankFocus, except for the variable merger and acquisition, which was 
derived from SNL – S&P Global Market Intelligence.  
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Table A.II presents the definitions for all variables of our sample and the respective 
expected sign. Additionally, in table A.III, we describe the questions made on the survey 
for each index, as defined by the authors. 
 
4.6 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Table I displays the summary statistics for risk, ownership, regulation and control 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Additionally, in table A.IV, we present the 
average value of each variable of our sample, clustered by country. 
Table I - Summary statistics of the variables 
VARIABLES N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Risk variables      
     Z-score (ln) 722 7.970 1.021 4.700 10.483 
     Capital Adequacy Ratio (%) 724 16.725 9.182 -5.000 222.920 
Governance variables      
     Large Shareholder 724 0.801 0.399 0.000 1.000 
     Voting Rights (%) 724 31.576 27.570 0.000 99.990 
     Independence (%) 724 61.675 23.022 14.286 100.000 
     Board Size 724 10.702 4.051 3.000 20.000 
Regulation variables      
     Restrict 646 6.610 1.994 4.000 11.000 
     Capital Stringency 568 6.599 1.724 3.000 9.000 
     Official Supervisory Power 598 11.378 1.114 9.000 13.000 
     Private Monitoring 694 8.242 0.869 6.000 10.000 
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Control variables      
     Leverage Risk (%) 724 8.050 5.688 -4.196 65.010 
     Liquidity Risk (%) 724 34.388 58.327 1.550 819.090 
     Bank Business Activity (%) 724 53.910 19.041 1.340 87.480 
     Asset Quality (%) 723 35.464 68.231 -878.890 693.950 
     Bank Credit Risk (%) 705 10.863 11.696 0.000 88.970 
     Efficiency (%) 724 64.269 36.972 -484.150 586.120 
     Bank Size (ln) 724 16.579 2.550 10.861 21.536 
     Merges & Acquisitions 724 0.0580 0.2339 0.0000 1.0000 
     GDP (ln) 724 10.143 0.549 8.631 10.787 
 
The average Capital Adequacy Ratio is higher than the minimum required (8%), 
presenting a percentage of 16.725, meaning that the majority of banks are 
accomplishing the regulation.  
As seen in table A.IV, the country with lower percentage is Greece (12.300), mainly 
because of the economic and financial assistance program the country went through5. 
On the contrary, the highest percentage is seen in Netherland with an average 
percentage of 24.900. Continuing the analysis per country, the one with higher 
insolvency risk is Greece (5.998) for the reasons mentioned before, whereas the country 
with less probability of default is France (8.827). 
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the mean of large shareholder is 
0.801 indicating that the majority of banks of our sample have an owner with more than 
10% of shares. On the other hand, that percentage is not so high in a sense that the 
mean of the voting rights is merely 31.576. Additionally, only 4 banks have a shareholder 
with more than 90 % of the voting rights, where three come from Slovakia and 1 from 
                                                 
5 Provopoulos (2014) describes the economic environment in Greece and the banking system during 
the financial crisis. 
ANA JIN YE                                                RISK-TAKING BY BANKS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION: 
                                                                                                                                                                    EVIDENCE FROM EU COUNTRIES 
20 
 
Netherland. For shareholders with less than 10% of voting rights, we consider it as a null 
value, by following Laeven & Levine (2009). According to Kohler (2010), the mean of 
United Kingdom (UK) voting rights presented on table A.IV is lower comparing to 
Continental Europe6 mainly due to the protection of shareholders rights in UK, where 
large shareholders do not need to have much control of the bank in order to be able to 
control the management decisions.  
As to the term of independent directors, the mean percentage is 61.675 with a 
minimum 14.286 and a maximum of 100.000. In this sample, 19 financial institutions 
have a full independent board. The lower percentage belongs to a Lithuanian bank - 
Siauliu Bankas. It is also found that, on average, the board of European Union countries 
has 10 elements, with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 20. The bank with fewer 
elements is Prima Bank Slovensko A.S., in spite of not being the smallest bank when 
considering the average of total assets. The smallest bank has 7 directors on the board. 
On the other hand, there are three banks with 20 board members7, all of them belonging 
to the top 15 biggest banks of our sample.  
Concerning the regulation variables, there are great differences between countries 
regarding the restrictions, where the range of this index is 3-12 and in our sample we 
have a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 11. Poland is the country with higher 
restrictions in banking activities. Concerning capital stringency, the average is 6.599, 
which is slightly above the range media (5) of this index. The official supervisory agencies 
in countries from EU have a highly power over the banking system, since the minimum 
is 9 and a maximum of 13 in a range of 0-14. Lastly, the minimum value for private 
monitoring is 6, as it is the case for Portugal, and the maximum value is 10, 
corresponding to a mean of 8.242. 
In table II we present the correlation matrix by using Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients. According to Barako & Tower (2007) and Gujarati (2003, p.359) findings, 
  
                                                 
6 The author considers the following countries as Continental Europe: France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. 
7 HSBC Holdings PLC, Deutsche Bank AG and Commerzbank AG.  
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Table II - Correlation matrix 
 





                 
(2) 
CAR 
0.262* 1.000                  




-0.138* -0.040 1.000                 
0.000 0.277                  
(4) 
Voting Rights 
-0.143* -0.030 0.571* 1.000                
0.000 0.417 0.000                 
(5) 
Independence 
0.196* 0.197* -0.065 -0.071 1.000               
0.000 0.000 0.081 0.055                
(6) 
Board Size 
0.177* -0.146* -0.139* -0.237* -0.191* 1.000              
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000               
(7)  
Leverage 
-0.266* 0.104* 0.167* 0.074* -0.100* -0.275* 1.000             
0.000 0.005 0.000 0.047 0.007 0.000              
(8) 
Liquidity 
-0.083* 0.043 0.013 -0.006 -0.066 -0.036 0.709* 1.000            




-0.219* -0.268* 0.051 -0.048 -0.151* 0.012 -0.029 -0.371* 1.000           
0.000 0.000 0.168 0.199 0.000 0.748 0.435 0.000            
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-0.318* -0.155* -0.021 -0.074* -0.136* 0.104* 0.054 0.040 0.231* 1.000          
0.000 0.000 0.567 0.046 0.000 0.005 0.146 0.283 0.000           
(11) 
Credit Risk 
-0.537* -0.144* 0.067 -0.013 -0.186* -0.090* 0.556* 0.421* 0.042 0.398* 1.000         
0.000 0.000 0.075 0.729 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.268 0.000          
(12) 
Efficiency 
-0.033 -0.001 -0.032 0.031 0.122* -0.032 0.174* 0.236* -0.145* 0.097* 0.137* 1.000        
0.372 0.988 0.388 0.407 0.001 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000         
(13) 
Bank Size 
0.172* -0.100* -0.269* -0.150* -0.076* 0.635* -0.529* -0.134* -0.015 0.049 -0.258* -0.127* 1.000       
0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.687 0.188 0.000 0.001        
(14) 
M & A 
-0.032 -0.051 -0.024 -0.063 -0.074* 0.166* -0.126* 0.004 -0.045 0.018 -0.025 -0.051 0.276* 1.000      
0.392 0.170 0.513 0.089 0.046 0.000 0.001 0.920 0.223 0.622 0.503 0.168 0.000       
(15)  
GDP 
0.402* 0.151* -0.117* -0.379* 0.185* 0.253* -0.014 0.197* -0.165* -0.147* -0.155* 0.034 0.033 0.015 1.000     
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.715 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.360 0.374 0.680      
(16) 
Restrict 
-0.051 -0.104* 0.139* 0.324* -0.146* -0.224* 0.093* -0.015 0.162* -0.075 -0.025 -0.037 -0.128* -0.053 -0.340* 1.000    
0.193 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.711 0.000 0.057 0.523 0.352 0.001 0.180 0.000     
(17)  
Capital 
-0.026 -0.055 0.150* 0.214* -0.080 -0.237* -0.035 -0.027 -0.113* -0.016 0.109* -0.063 -0.110* 0.027 -0.401* 0.466* 1.000   
0.539 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.407 0.521 0.007 0.699 0.010 0.134 0.008 0.522 0.000 0.000    
(18)  
Official 
-0.164* 0.054 -0.122* -0.043 0.122* -0.001 0.171* 0.061 0.043 0.070 0.198* 0.032 -0.198* -0.154* -0.122* -0.041 -0.537* 1.000  
0.000 0.191 0.003 0.289 0.003 0.979 0.000 0.135 0.291 0.087 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.334 0.000   
(19)  
Private 
-0.043 -0.060 -0.061 -0.035 -0.085* 0.151* -0.105* 0.034 -0.024 0.009 -0.113* -0.017 0.343* 0.145* -0.007 0.101* -0.185* -0.433* 1.000 
0.256 0.117 0.110 0.355 0.026 0.000 0.005 0.377 0.520 0.819 0.003 0.652 0.000 0.000 0.862 0.010 0.000 0.000  
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the multicollinearity issue is not at stake in our model, since none of the correlation 
coefficient8 are superior to 0.8. The highest correlation coefficient is 0.709 and it is 
between the variables leverage and liquidity.  
Although the relation is not very strong, it was nevertheless found some statistically 
significance correlation between z-score and all the governance variables, where 
independence has the highest value - 0.196. For the variable board size, it is showed to 
have a positive effect on z-score indicating that a greater board is associated to a more 
stable bank (higher z-score), which differs from previous studies. In terms of the variable 
of Capital Adequacy Ratio, the relation is only significant for Independence and Board 
Size at a significant level of 0.05, with a coefficient correlation of 0.197 and -0.146, 
respectively. 
 
4.7 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
Although several studies have been analysing the interaction between bank risk-
taking, corporate governance and regulation, the signs of those relations are still 
ambiguous. Our empirical analysis consists on testing the following hypothesis: 
• H1: Stronger corporate governance (i.e less concentrated ownership, small 
and more independent board) has a negative influence on bank risk-taking 
behaviour; 
• H2: Stricter regulation is negatively related to bank risk. 
For this purpose, we use the generalized least squared (GLS) random effect (RE) 
method, following Baltagi & Wu (1999) and Pathan (2009). Considering that our sample 
is a balanced panel data, the most suitable method is GLS. The results of the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test lead us to exclude the pooled Ordinary Least 
Squared (OLS) method. We have also not opted by the fixed effect (FE) method for our 
                                                 
8 Between two independent variables 
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model since our key explanatory variables are constant over time (Wooldridge, 2015, p. 
444).  
Formally, we estimate the following equation for hypothesis 1: 
 
(1) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1  +  𝛽𝛽2 (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖2016  +  𝛽𝛽3 (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖2016  + 𝛽𝛽4 (𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖2016  +
 𝛽𝛽5 (𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖2016  +  𝛽𝛽6 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
The dependent variable RISK is a proxy for the alternatives measures of bank risk: z-
score and capital adequacy ratio, where subscripts i indicates individual bank (i = 
1,2,…,121) and t year (t = 2011,…,2016). The explanatory variables are LARGE, RIGHTS, 
IND and BS at year 2016. LARGE is a dummy variable for large shareholder, RIGHTS is the 
percentage held by the large shareholder, IND is the percentage of independent director 
on the board and BS indicates the number of members on the board. CONTROL 
considers the bank specific control variables: leverage risk, liquidity risk, bank business 
activity, asset quality, credit risk, efficiency, bank size and merges & acquisitions. β 
parameters are the estimated coefficient and ε is the error term. 
In addition, we also test the hypothesis of the impact of regulation on bank risk-
taking (H2) by estimating the following regression equation: 
 
(2) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1  +  𝛽𝛽2 (𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅)𝑗𝑗2011  +  𝛽𝛽3 (𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝑗𝑗2011  +
 𝛽𝛽4 (𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝑗𝑗2011  +  𝛽𝛽5 (𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿)𝑗𝑗2011  +  𝛽𝛽6 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐵𝐵7 (𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  +
 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
In this equation, RISK indicates the different variables of risk-taking (z-score and 
capital adequacy ratio), where subscripts i indicates individual bank (i = 1,2,…,121) and 
t year (t = 2011,…,2016). The regulation index are the explanatory variables for each j 
country: RESTRICT is the index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, CAPITAL is 
the index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, OFFICIAL is the index of the power of 
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the bank supervisory agency and PRIVATE is the index of monitoring on the part of the 
private sector of the banking system. CONTROL considers the bank specific control 
variables: leverage risk, liquidity risk, bank business activity, asset quality, credit risk, 
efficiency, bank size and merges & acquisitions. This regression is clustered at a country 
level, hence we use GDP as a country control variable representing the Gross Domestic 
Product at j country and year t. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 BANK RISK-TAKING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
In table III we present the results of regressing the equation (1). Firstly we use z-
score as our bank risk measure and then we regress independently the corporate 
governance variables. We find that a large shareholder structure, as well as a higher 
percentage of voting rights, are both negatively associated with inverse insolvency risk. 
This outcome supports the idea that higher concentration in ownership leads to an 
increase in bank risk-taking (Laeven & Levine, 2009; Esty, 1998; Galai & Masulis, 1976). 
Furthermore, the result for independence is consistent with prior empirical analysis 
(Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Wang & Hsu, 2013), where a greater 
percentage of independent members on the board indicates a more stable bank (higher 
z-score).  
For the board size, although an inverted association might be expected, instead a 
positive sign is displayed. This behaviour can be associated with the fact that through 
diverse director’s background, deliberations on the board meetings can benefit from 
additional acknowledge, ultimately resulting on following the ideal strategy, with less 
associated risk. Additionally, according to de Andres & Vallelado (2008), more directors 
is beneficial since it can result in better monitoring and advisory. 
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Table III – Generalized least squared random effect regression results between bank 
risk (dependent variable - Z-score) and corporate governance 











LARGE -0.363*    -0.208 -0.221 
 (0.209)    (0.247) (0.262) 
RIGHTS  -0.005*   -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.003)   (0.004) (0.004) 
IND   0.009**  0.010*** 0.010** 
   (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
BS    0.045** 0.052** 0.057** 
    (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) 
LEVERAGE      0.064*** 
      (0.013) 
LIQUIDITY      -0.002*** 
      (0.001) 
BUSINESS      -0.011*** 
      (0.002) 
ASSETQUALITY      -0.000*** 
      (0.000) 
CREDIT      -0.003* 
      (0.002) 
EFFICIENCY      -0.000** 
      (0.000) 
SIZE      0.047 
      (0.039) 
M&A      -0.033 
      (0.026) 
Constant 8.252*** 8.127*** 7.426*** 7.478*** 6.983*** 6.427*** 
 (0.181) (0.128) (0.266) (0.234) (0.425) (0.682) 
       
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 702 
Number of banks 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 
the 5% level; * significance at the 10% level 
When we consider all corporate governance variables together, the results change 
for the large shareholder and the voting rights, as in these circumstances they present 
no significant association with bank risk. For the board structure variables, the results 
remain broadly the same, with a slightly increase on the coefficient estimator. Finally, 
the inclusion of the control variables also indicates that the ownership structure does 
not have an impact on bank risk-taking. On the contrary, independence and board size 
are statistically significant to insolvency risk.  
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Now we consider the capital adequacy ratio as the alternative variable for bank risk 
for equation 1, where the results are presented in table IV.  
Table IV – Generalized least squared random effect regression results between bank 













       
LARGE -0.806    -0.416 -0.373 
 (1.202)    (1.490) (1.097) 
RIGHTS  -0.012   -0.015 -0.028 
  (0.019)   (0.026) (0.022) 
IND   0.085**  0.072** 0.051** 
   (0.034)  (0.029) (0.020) 
BS    -0.363** -0.312** -0.249* 
    (0.171) (0.142) (0.136) 
LEVERAGE      1.178** 
      (0.534) 
LIQUIDITY      -0.067** 
      (0.030) 
BUSINESS      -0.192*** 
      (0.056) 
ASSETQUALITY      0.001 
      (0.005) 
CREDIT      -0.200** 
      (0.089) 
EFFICIENCY      -0.006 
      (0.005) 
SIZE      0.673** 
      (0.289) 
M&A      -0.629 
      (0.502) 
Constant 17.470*** 17.194*** 11.582*** 20.707*** 16.475*** 12.173** 
 (1.010) (0.865) (1.756) (2.283) (1.577) (5.276) 
       
Observations 724 724 724 724 724 704 
Number of 
Banks 
121 121 121 121 121 121 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 
the 5% level; * significance at the 10% level 
We follow the previous method and the results are essentially the same. When we 
analyse individually the ownership structure, no significant association is found. 
Regarding independence, the positive relationship between capital adequacy ratio and 
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the explanatory variables remain similar, emphasizing the fact that higher percentage 
of independent directors as board members contributes to a less risk-taking behaviour. 
By regressing the board size variable, we can say that board size affects positively the 
bank risk-taking behaviour. This means that banks with larger boards increase their risk-
taking behaviour, supporting Battaglia & Gallo (2017) and Wang & Hsu (2013) findings. 
Moreover, the introduction of the control variables also does not change the results. 
Considering the fact that corporate governance variables are from the year of 2016, 
we also run a regression where all of the variables are taken from that given year. In this 
case, we use the OLS method since we are no longer considering a panel data. The 
empirical analysis consists on taking into account the insolvency risk as our risk measure 
and examines ownership and board structure individually. The results, presented on 
table V, are in line with the previous model, apart from the considerable difference in 
the board size variable. By regressing this variable individually, the board size affects 
bank stability (higher z-score) negatively, indicating that smaller board tends to take less 
risk, following Battaglia & Gallo (2017) and Wang & Hsu (2013) results. Furthermore, 
large shareholders and their voting rights have no influence on bank risk and the 
interaction coefficient between independence and z-score is positive. In this perspective 
we can state that more independent directors within a small board composition reduce 
the probability of a bank default. For completeness sake, we have also introduced the 
control variables. In this case the results remain consistent with previous models, except 
for the interaction between risk measure and board size, where it is found that the 
correlation is not significant. 
All in all, the hypothesis 1 is partially supported, where little or no evidence were 
found for ownership concentration and distinct results were showed for board size. In 
terms of independence, we can affirm than more independent directors is positively 
associated with less risk. 
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Table V – Ordinary least squared regression results between bank risk (dependent 













       
LARGE 0.325    0.474 0.445 
 (0.362)    (0.368) (0.368) 
RIGHTS  -0.000   -0.005 -0.006 
  (0.004)   (0.003) (0.004) 
IND   0.015***  0.013** 0.010** 
   (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
BS    -0.073*** -0.058** -0.046 
    (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) 
LEVERAGE      -0.129** 
      (0.056) 
LIQUIDITY      0.011*** 
      (0.004) 
BUSINESS      0.023*** 
      (0.009) 
ASSETQUALITY      -0.009*** 
      (0.003) 
CREDIT      -0.007 
      (0.009) 
EFFICIENCY      -0.005 
      (0.007) 
SIZE      -0.099 
      (0.065) 
M&A      -0.150 
      (0.374) 
Constant 7.468*** 7.729*** 6.790*** 8.512*** 7.352*** 9.203*** 
 (0.346) (0.194) (0.289) (0.266) (0.529) (1.309) 
       
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 114 
R-squared 0.012 0.000 0.085 0.063 0.139 0.345 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 
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5.2 BANK RISK-TAKING AND REGULATION 
 
Table VI intends to show the relationship between bank risk-taking and regulation 
by using the equation (2).  
First, we regress the regulations indexes individually, which are the restriction of 
banking activities (RESTRICT), capital stringency (CAPITAL), official power supervisory 
(OFFICIAL) and private monitoring (PRIVATE). We found no evidence that regulation has 
an impact on the bank risk-taking behaviour. Additionally, when we introduce the 
control variables it does not change the results of the association between regulations 
and bank risk-taking. Those results are not consistent with prior studies, where some 
interaction was found between corporate governance, bank risk and regulation. 
Moreover, the change of the dependent variable to capital adequacy ratio, also displays 
the same unexpected results.  
Following Laeven & Levine (2009) empirical analysis, we also test the jointly effect 
of corporate governance and regulation on bank risk-taking. However, our outcome is 
different from theirs. Considering the results of our model, there are no evidences 
supporting hypothesis 2. 
A possible explanation for those results might be related to the fact that, during the 
period covered in our model (2011-2016), European banks were already facing 
extremely strict regulation, due to the regulatory pressure that followed the financial 
crisis. For that reason, and taking into account the fierce prudential requirements 
already in place, there might be the case that banks had no margin to take more risk. In 
this perspective, small tweaks in the regulatory environment would not have an impact 
in banks’ risk-taking behaviour. In addition, Bouwens & Verriest (2014) also found no 
direct evidence between regulation and bank risk-taking. 
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Table VI – Generalized least squared random effect regression results between bank 













       
RESTRICT -0.024    -0.053 0.024 
 (0.053)    (0.054) (0.063) 
CAPITAL  -0.014   -0.077 0.032 
  (0.058)   (0.081) (0.080) 
OFFICIAL   -0.141  -0.073 -0.111 
   (0.097)  (0.083) (0.108) 
PRIVATE    -0.048 0.170 -0.157 
    (0.142) (0.218) (0.200) 
LEVERAGE      0.062*** 
      (0.022) 
LIQUIDITY      -0.003*** 
      (0.001) 
BUSINESS      -0.009*** 
      (0.002) 
ASSETQUALITY      -0.001*** 
      (0.000) 
CREDIT      -0.002 
      (0.002) 
EFFICIENCY      -0.000 
      (0.000) 
SIZE      0.093*** 
      (0.032) 
M&A      -0.036 
      (0.024) 
GDP      0.443** 
      (0.198) 
Constant 8.036*** 7.919*** 9.622*** 8.333*** 8.145*** 4.245* 
 (0.359) (0.289) (1.191) (1.215) (2.182) (2.490) 
       
Observations 644 566 598 692 424 418 
Number of 
Banks 
108 95 100 116 71 71 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 
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5.3 ROBUSTNESS TEST 
 
Following Laeven & Levine (2009) robustness tests, we conduct two more analysis 
to confirm our results. First, we exclude banks considered as widely held, that is banks 
where the largest shareholder owns less than 10 percent of the voting rights. The reason 
for excluding those banks is due to the consideration of a null percentage of voting 
rights, instead of the exact number leading. Furthermore, we consider a bank with a 
large shareholder structure when an owner holds more that 20 percent of voting rights, 
instead of the initial 10 percent. 
Even after those adjustments to the sample, the results still hold: i) no significant 
evidence in relation between ownership structure and bank risk, ii) the board structure 
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The financial crisis forced significant structural changes in the macroeconomic 
environment and in the financial system, particularly in the regulatory and supervisory 
framework. In this perspective, risk measures and corporate governance have been a 
trend topic among governments and supervisors. Moreover, an increasing number of 
studies have been presented concerning the role of corporate governance on banks’ 
risk-taking behaviour and how the regulatory framework affects it. The aim of our 
empirical analysis was to shed more light in these different subjects and the dynamics 
among them. From our main results, we can conclude that a large shareholder structure 
has no material impact on bank risk, although the board structure is significantly 
associated with risk. More specifically, a higher percentage of independent board 
members lead to a lesser probability of default. On the other hand, in certain 
circumstances, the board size shows some mixed results, where a positive or negative 
correlation with the bank risk-taking behaviour can be observed. Finally, no evidence 
where found in the relation between regulation and bank risk. 
Moreover, our model presents some limitations regarding ownership concentration. 
First, we solely consider the voting rights, rather than including cash flow rights and 
voting rights, likewise Laeven & Levine (2009). Accordingly to empirical studies, the 
presence of indirect chains of control generates differences between cash flow and 
voting rights (Caprio et al., 2007). Second, we use the direct percentage of the voting 
rights, though the majority of large shareholders are corporations owned by other 
entities. Additionally, the information related to corporate governance concerns the 
year 2016, albeit all specific variables cover the period between 2011 and 2016. In this 
perspective, for further studies, we suggest to use the total (direct and indirect) cash 
flow rights instead of the direct voting rights. Also, it might be relevant to collect 
information related with corporate governance for the covered period (2011-2016) in 
order to check for sensitiveness on bank risk-taking behaviour of little changes in the 
corporate governance model. 
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Figure A.1 – GDP in EU countries | Euro per capita 
 Source: Eurostat 
Source: OECD 
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Table A.I – Value added by activity (annual growth rate - %) 
Activity 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Agriculture, forestry,  
fishing 1,40 5,23 -0,04 -3,57 2,82 -5,55 3,74 6,12 -0,94 -0,94 
Construction 1,96 -1,06 -7,24 -2,66 -1,95 -4,98 -2,61 1,42 2,00 1,61 
Finance and insurance 6,07 1,61 -1,27 -0,60 1,93 -0,11 0,39 -1,45 -0,23 1,68 
Industry  
(including energy) 3,39 -1,39 -11,34 7,68 2,84 -1,58 -0,71 2,46 3,09 3,07 
Information,  
communication 7,80 3,99 -1,14 2,54 4,19 2,74 2,18 3,87 5,82 4,35 
Manufacturing 3,86 -1,72 -13,49 9,16 4,62 -2,31 -0,29 3,59 3,89 3,27 
Other services  
activities 0,97 2,10 -1,38 -0,28 1,06 -0,65 -0,85 1,30 1,48 0,74 
Professional, scientific,  
suppot services 6,26 1,97 -6,94 2,66 3,06 0,58 1,63 3,49 3,68 2,71 
Public administration,  
defence, education,  
health, social work 
0,88 1,74 1,40 1,10 0,66 0,32 0,27 0,74 0,79 1,09 
Real estate 2,24 1,29 1,06 0,79 1,55 0,98 1,80 1,41 1,32 0,61 
Wholesale, retail trade,  
repairs, transport,  
accomodation, food, services 
3,54 -0,08 -5,87 1,33 1,96 0,24 -0,12 2,12 2,69 2,13 
Total 3,28 0,74 -4,34 2,11 1,81 -0,30 0,28 1,88 2,21 1,97 
Source: OECD 
Table A.II – Definition of the variables 
Variable Definition Measures Expected sign 
Risk variables  
Z-SCORE Z-score (ln) 
Z-SCORE=(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA 
correspond to Return on Assets, calculated as 
Net income plus Interest Expense divided by 
Total assets. σ(ROA) indicates the volatility of 







Division of Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets. Dependent  variable 
Corporate Governance variables  
LARGE Large Shareholder 
Dummy variable that assumes 1 when it is 
classified as large shareholder (holds more than 
10% of voting rights) and 0 otherwise. 
Positive/Negative 
RIGHTS Voting Rights (%) 
Percentage of direct voting rights of the largest 
shareholder. Positive/Negative 
IND Independence (%) 
Percentage of independent members on board of 
directors. Positive 
BS Board Size Number of directors on the board. Negative 
Regulation variables  
RESTRICT Restrict Index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities Positive/Negative 





Index of the power of the bank supervisory 
agency Positive/Negative 
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PRIVATE Private Monitoring 
Index of monitoring on the part of the private 
sector of the banking system Positive/Negative 
Control variables  
LEVERAGE Leverage Risk (%) Ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets Positive 
LIQUIDITY Liquidity Risk (%) 
Ratio of liquid assets (cash and balances with 
central banks plus net loans and advances to 
banks plus level one assets) over deposits and 
short term funding (customer deposits plus short 
term funding) 
Positive 
BUSINESS Bank Business Activity (%) Ratio loans over total assets Negative 
ASSETQUALITY Asset Quality (%) Ratio of loan loss provision to net interest revenue Positive 
CREDIT Bank Credit Risk (%) Ratio of impaired loans to gross loans Negative 
EFFICIENCY Efficiency (%) Ratio of total operating expenses over total operating income Negative 
SIZE Bank Size (ln) Total assets Negative 
M&A Merges & Acquisitions 
Dummy variable that assumes 1 when a bank 
was subject to a merger or a major acquisition 
and 0 otherwise 
Negative 
GDP GDP (ln) GDP per capita Positive 
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Table A.III – Detailed information regarding regulatory index 
Variable Definition Range Description 
Restrict 
Index of regulatory 
restrictions on bank 
activities 
3-12 
Three questions are considered for this index, measuring the conditions for banks to engage in securities activities, insurance 
activities and real estate activities. The possible answers are whether is unrestricted (=1), permitted (=2), restricted (=3) or 
prohibited (=4). Higher value indicates a higher restriction on bank activities. 
Capital 
Stringency 
Index of regulatory 
oversight of bank 
capital 
0-10 
This index measures whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from 
capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined. It is based on the following questions: 
(1) At the end of 2010, was the Basel I the regulatory capital adequacy regime? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(2) The credit risk is covered by the regulatory minimum capital requirements? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(3) The market risk is covered by the regulatory minimum capital requirements? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(4) The item “unrealized losses in fair valued exposures” is deducted from regulatory capital? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(5) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? (If > 0.75 = 1; otherwise is 0) 
(6) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(7) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? 
(Yes = 0; No = 1) 
(8) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? 
(Yes = 0; No = 1) 




Index of the power 
of the bank 
supervisory agency 
0-14 
This index measures whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems. It is based on the following questions: 
(1) Does the banking supervisor have the right to meet with the external auditors and discuss their report without the approval 
of the bank? 
(2) Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or 
senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 
(3) In cases where the supervisor identifies that the bank has received an inadequate audit, does the supervisor have the powers 
to take actions against the external auditor? 
(4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 
(5) Do banks disclose to the supervisors off-balance sheet items? 
(6) The following enforcement powers: “Require banks to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses” is available to 
the supervisory agency? 
(7) The following enforcement powers: “Require banks to reduce or suspend dividends to shareholders” is available to the 
supervisory agency? 
(8) The following enforcement powers: “Require banks to reduce or suspend bonuses and other remuneration to bank directors 
and managers” is available to the supervisory agency? 
(9) Which authority has the powers to declare insolvency? 
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(10) Which authority has the powers to supersede shareholders' rights? 
(11) Which authority has the powers to remove and replace bank senior management and directors? 
For questions 1-8, value 1 is added when the answer is yes, otherwise is 0. Concerning the questions 9-11, it takes value 1 when 
the authority is Bank Supervisor, 0.5 when is the Deposit Insurance Agency or Bank Restructuring or Asset Management Agency 
and 0 when the authority is the Court or Other. 
The calculation for this index is: (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)+(5)+(6)+(7)+(8)*2+(9)+(10)*2+(11)*2 and higher values indicate greater power. 
Private 
Monitoring 
Index of monitoring 
on the part of the 
private sector of the 
banking system 
0-12 
This index measures whether there incentives/ability for the private monitoring of firms, with higher values indicating more 
private monitoring. It is based on the following questions: 
(1) Is an audit by a professional external auditor required for all commercial banks in your jurisdiction? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(2) If yes, does the external auditor have to obtain a professional certification or pass a specific exam to qualify as such? (Yes = 1; 
No = 0) 
(3) How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by international credit rating agencies (e.g., 
Moody's, Standard and Poor)? And how many commercial banks were there at the end of 2010? (1 = 100%; 0 ≠ 100%) 
(4) How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by domestic credit rating agencies? And how 
many commercial banks were there at the end of 2010? (1 = 100%; 0 ≠ 100%) 
(5) Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system for commercial banks? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(6) Were insured depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal protection) the last time a bank failed? 
(7) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is still performing? (Yes = 1; No = 
0) 
(8) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is non-performing? (Yes = 0; No = 
1) 
(9) Are banks required to prepare consolidated accounts for accounting purposes? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(10) Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or misleading? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(11) Is the subordinated debt item allowed as part Tier 1 capital? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(12) Is the subordinated debt allowed as part of Tier 2 capital? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(13) Do banks disclose off-balance sheet items to the public? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(14) Are bank regulators/supervisors required to make public formal enforcement actions, which include cease and desist orders 
and written agreements between a bank regulatory/supervisory body and a banking organization? (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
The calculation for this index is: (1)*(2)+(3)+(4)+(5)+(6)+(7)+(8)+(9)+(10)+(11)*(12)+(13)+(14) and higher values indicate more 
private oversight. 
Note: The calculation of questions 3 and 4 differs according to the number of commercial banks. If is > 9, the calculation is (number 
of banks rated)/10*100. If is < 10 then the calculation is (number of banks rated)/(total number of banks). 
Source: Barth et al. (2012) 
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Table A.IV – Averages of all variables clustered by country 
 
Panel A – Dependent and corporate governance variables 







Austria 6 8.055 22.199 1.000 24.165 86.765 14.000 
Belgium 2 8.231 17.749 1.000 34.275 26.042 14.000 
Bulgaria 1 6.943 14.112 1.000 42.500 50,000 6.000 
Croatia 4 7.977 17.875 1.000 36.490 100.000 6.500 
Cyprus 1 7.276 15.728 1.000 26.200 76.923 13.000 
Czech Republic 1 7.975 15.670 1.000 60.350 22.222 9.000 
Denmark 21 8.427 16.920 0.857 17.856 62.412 9.238 
Finland 2 8.577 17.522 0.857 12.080 100,000 7.500 
France 4 8.827 15.080 0.857 34.485 52.459 14.750 
Germany 8 8.685 20.562 0.857 38.913 72.292 11.125 
Greece 5 5.998 12.300 1.000 30.098 40.867 11.200 
Hungary 1 6.804 18.117 0.000 0.000 67.000 6.000 
Italy 17 7.708 15.801 0.647 26.862 51.822 13.412 
Lithuania 1 8.141 13.225 1.000 18.240 14.286 7.000 
Malta 3 7.689 14.525 1.000 52.153 83.796 8.667 
Netherlands 3 8.669 24.900 0.333 33.330 100,000 5.667 
Poland 11 7.410 14.821 0.909 50.915 52.783 8.364 
Portugal 2 8.114 12.708 1.000 31.084 43.590 15.500 
Romania 3 7.029 16.462 0.667 49.710 46.111 6.333 
Slovakia 4 8.108 14.877 1.000 96.177 63.766 6.500 
Spain 8 7.845 13.315 0.875 27.564 51.041 13.625 
Sweden 4 8.686 20.725 0.875 13.010 71.827 11.250 
United Kingdom 9 8.009 17.576 0.556 18.983 63.958 12.333 
Total 121 7.974 17.544 0.801 31.541 61.781 10.686 
Panel B – Regulation country control variables 
   No. 








Austria 6 10.566 4 4 12 8 
Belgium 2 10.484 5 8 11 8 
Bulgaria 1 8.700 5 9 11 8 
Croatia 4 9.260 6 8 13 8 
Cyprus 1 9.981 7 9 11 9 
Czech Republic 1 9.654 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Denmark 21 10.748 7 n.a. 11 8 
Finland 2 10.536 5 6 n.a. 7 
France 4 10.384 8 8 10 10 
Germany 8 10.486 n.a. 8 11 7 
Greece 5 9.733 6 7 n.a. 8 
Hungary 1 9.273 5 4 13 8 
Italy 17 10.204 7 6 13 8 
Lithuania 1 9.391 6 7 11 7 
Malta 3 9.852 8 7 12 8 
Netherlands 3 10.594 5 8 11 8 
Poland 11 9.263 11 8 11 9 
Portugal 2 9.730 5 4 12 6 
Romania 3 8.916 4 8 12 7 
Slovakia 4 9.542 9 6 11 8 
Spain 8 10.034 5 8 9 9 
Sweden 4 10.714 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 9 10.445 4 3 n.a. 10 
Total 121 10.144 6.602 6.589 11.380 8.241 
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Panel C – Bank-specific control variables 
   No. 









Austria 6 8.651 19.211 58.466 24.385 5.942 62.599 16.68 
Belgium 2 4.352 38.688 50.058 -3.963 5.183 -31.372 19.394 
Bulgaria 1 9.206 20.688 63.467 60.117 14.925 54.338 15.231 
Croatia 4 10.063 21.342 54.094 31.515 13.355 65.839 13.665 
Cyprus 1 8.229 37.813 49.382 100.437 40.418 57.453 15.834 
Czech Republic 1 7.189 16.080 57.177 7.768 5.057 42.745 17.288 
Denmark 21 10.718 42.576 59.195 34.959 13.138 62.755 14.289 
Finland 2 4.084 9.577 71.187 5.532 1.229 77.498 15.684 
France 4 3.063 75.608 24.938 20.017 5.968 70.992 20.907 
Germany 8 7.483 45.689 -26.921 -2.239 5.178 81.292 16.714 
Greece 5 7.817 5.552 66.183 147.481 33.912 72.546 17.579 
Hungary 1 10.227 16.770 58.045 45.345 17.653 58.088 17.36 
Italy 17 9.367 55.151 52.388 55.061 16.058 67.767 16.845 
Lithuania 1 7.769 10.708 57.227 32.045 7.968 53.945 14.097 
Malta 3 6.742 42.693 42.746 23.159 5.588 61.842 15.163 
Netherlands 3 5.578 33.442 34.324 7.791 2.511 83.793 15.664 
Poland 11 8.916 10.399 66.015 23.412 7.035 56.825 16.596 
Portugal 2 6.753 13.286 65.448 72.977 4.932 64.705 17.88 
Romania 3 8.685 16.527 46.361 64.782 23.408 65.546 15.238 
Slovakia 4 7.665 9.525 70.418 21.845 7.454 66.545 15.262 
Spain 8 5.333 21.472 53.993 58.915 9.159 62.305 18.536 
Sweden 4 4.333 61.333 58.008 5.457 0.942 49.653 19.6 
United 
Kingdom 9 6.865 39.460 49.742 23.590 5.221 73.334 18.391 
Total 121 8.115 34.494 53.856 36.906 10.838 64.301 16.579 
 
 
 
